"I can say that nothing about my personal views regarding the death penalty (relating either to policy or law) would make it difficult for me to carry out the Solicitor General’s responsibilities in this area."
SOLICITOR GENERAL CONFIRMATION HEARING, 2009
Written Questions for Solicitor General Nominee Elena Kagan from Senator Specter during her confirmation hearing in 2009 (page 303).
The Death Penalty 1. Justice Marshall, the justice for whom you clerked, maintained that the death penalty was always unconstitutional. Do you think that Justice Marshall had it right?
a. Do you support the death penalty?
b. Do you believe it is constitutional as applied in the United States?
c. If your answer is no, are you prepared to argue in favor of the constitutionality of the death penalty before the Supreme Court?
Answer: I am fully prepared to argue, consistent with Supreme Court precedents, that the death penalty is constitutional. As Solicitor General, I would represent the interests of the United States, as expressed in legislation and executive policy. Like other nominees to the Solicitor General position, I have refrained from providing my personal opinions (except where I previously have disclosed them), both because these opinions will play no part in my official decisions and because such statements of opinion might be used to undermine the interests of the United States in litigation. But I can say that nothing about my personal views regarding the death penalty (relating either to policy or law) would make it difficult for me to carry out the Solicitor General’s responsibilities in this area.
2. Last year, in Kennedy v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court held that the death penalty for the crime of child rape always violates the Eighth Amendment. Writing for a five-justice majority, Justice Kennedy based his opinion partly on the fact that 37 jurisdictions – 36 states and the federal government – did not allow for capital punishment in child rape cases. In reality, however, Congress and the President specifically authorized the use of capital punishment in cases of child rape under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) in the National Defense Authorization Act of 2006, as reported first by Col. Dwight H. Sullivan in his blog and later by the New York Times.
a. Given the heinousness of the crime, as well as the new information on the federal government’s codification of capital punishment in child rape cases under the UCMJ, do you believe Kennedy v. Louisiana was wrongly decided? If not, why?
b. Following the Supreme Court’s decision, President Obama announced at a press conference: “I think that the death penalty should be applied in very narrow circumstances for the most egregious of crimes. I think that the rape of a small child, 6 or 8 years old, is a heinous crime.” Do you agree with that statement?
c. Would you, as Solicitor General, encourage the Court to reconsider its decision?
Answer: I do not think it comports with the responsibilities and role of the Solicitor General for me to say whether I view particular decisions as wrongly decided or whether I agree with criticisms of those decisions. The Solicitor General must show respect for the Court’s precedents and for the general principle of stare decisis. If I am confirmed as Solicitor General, I could not frequently or lightly ask the Court to reverse one of its precedents, and I certainly could not do so because I thought the case wrongly decided. There are circumstances, however, in which the Solicitor General properly can petition the Court to reconsider a decision. Relevant to this inquiry are whether a rule of law has been found unworkable, whether subsequent legal developments have left the rule an anachronism, or whether premises of fact are so far different from those initially assumed as to render the rule irrelevant or unjustifiable. The last of these factors would seem the one most potentially relevant to the Kennedy v. Louisiana decision. But I currently do not know enough about this decision or the facts and circumstances surrounding it to say whether I would ask the Court to reconsider it if I were confirmed as Solicitor General; nor would I make this determination without going through the extensive process that the Solicitor General’s office typically uses in such cases.